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CIVIL PROCEDURE-QUASI-IN-REM JURISDICTION-ATTACH-
MENT OF INSURER'S OBLIGATION To NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT
(SEIDER RULE) UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
320 (1980).
Two Indiana residents were involved in a single car accident in
Elkhart, Indiana on January 13, 1972. Savchuk was injured while
riding as a passenger in a car driven by Rush. The car was owned
by Rush's father who had a liability insurance policy issued in Indi-
ana with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State
Farm).
In June 1973, Savchuk moved with his parents to Minnesota,
and in 1974 he brought suit against Rush in Minnesota state court.'
Rush lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state to sustain in
personam jurisdiction.2 Savchuk therefore attempted to obtain
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over Rush3 by garnishing State Farm's ob-
ligation to defend and indemnify Rush under the insurance policy
since State Farm does business in Minnesota.4 State Farm, in re-
1. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated and remanded,
433 U.S. 902 (1977).
The plaintiff brought his action in Minnesota because his claim would have been barred
by the Indiana Guest Statute. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-3-3-1 (Bums 1980). Also, by the time
the trial court ruled on Savchuk's motion to file a supplemental complaint, the Indiana two-
year statute of limitations would have run. The constitutionality of the choice-of-law rule
that would apply forum law in this case was not contested. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320,
325 n.8 (1980).
2. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction was held to be predicated upon certain "minimum contacts" between
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Prior to International Shoe, subject to some
exceptions based on fictions, a defendant had to be present within the forum state for the
state to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. There are two types of quasi-in-rem proceedings. In one the plaintiff is seeking to
secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property. In the other, which will be discussed in
this Note, "the plaintiff does not assert that he has an interest in the thing, but asserts a claim
against the defendant personally and seeks, by attachment or garnishment, to apply the
thing to the satisfaction of his claim against the defendant." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 56-68, Introductory Note at 191 (1971). See Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215 (1905).
4. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 482, 245 N.W.2d 624, 626 (1976), vacated and
remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.41, subd. 2 (Cum. Supp. 1981)
states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, a plaintiff in any ac-
tion in a court of record for the recovery of money may issue a garnishee summons
before judgment therein in the following instances only:
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sponse to the garnishment summons, replied that it owed nothing to
Rush. Savchuk moved for permission to file a supplemental com-
plaint making State Farm a party to the action.5 Rush and State
Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The
trial court granted leave to amend the complaint and denied Rush's
and State Farm's motion to dismiss.6
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court holding that, under the Minnesota statute,7 State Farm's
obligation to defend and indemnify Rush is a res subject to prejudg-
ment garnishment.' The court held that such garnishment could be
used to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a defendant in an ac-
tion grounded on an incident occurring outside the forum state as
long as the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state.9 The court also
held that the assertion of jurisdiction over Rush was constitutional
because he had notice of the suit and an opportunity to defend, his
liability was limited to the amount of the policy, and the garnish-
(b) If the court shall order the issuance of such summons, if a summons and
complaint is filed with the appropriate court and either served on the defendant or
delivered to a sheriff for service on the defendant not more than 30 days after the
order is signed, and if, upon application to the court it shall appear that:
(2) The purpose of the garnishment is to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction
and that
(b) defendant is a nonresident individual, or a foreign corporation, partner-
ship or association.
(3) The garnishee and the debtor are parties to a contract of suretyship, guar-
antee, or insurance, because of which the garnishee may be held to respond to any
person for the claim asserted against the debtor in the main action.
5. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.495 (Cum. Supp. 1981) requires the garnishee to disclose
the amount of his debt to the defendant. Where the garnishee denies any liability, the judg-
ment creditor may file a supplemental complaint making the garnishee a party to the action.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.51 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
6. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the defendant and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and insuffi-
ciency of service of process.
7. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.41, subd. 2 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
8. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 485, 245 N.W.2d 624, 628 (1976), vacated and
remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
9. Id. The court relied upon a threefold test for determining the constitutionality of
garnishing the insurer's obligation to defend the insured: (1) proper notice must be given the
defendant to afford him adequate opportunity to defend his property; (2) the defendant
cannot be exposed to liability greater than the policy limits; (3) the procedure may be uti-
lized only by residents of the forum state. The court was following a precedent set by the
New York courts. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1966).
NOTES
ment procedure is available only to Minnesota residents.' 0 On ap-
peal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the decision and
remanded it" for further consideration in light of the Court's deci-
sion in Shaffer v. Heitner. 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court held on remand that garnish-
ment of an insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify an insured
provides quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in compliance with due process
standards.' 3 This post-Shaffer affirmance was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court which reversed and held that use of
the garnishment procedure to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was
unconstitutional. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
The exercise of state court jurisdiction is limited by the due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. 14 The first case which attempted to delineate
the scope of jurisdiction over persons and property under the due
process clause was Pennoyer v. Neff.15 The Court in Pennoyer deter-
mined that jurisdiction is coextensive with state sovereign power.
The Court espoused two basic principles: A state has exclusive ju-
risdiction over persons and property within its territory; and "no
State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory."' 6 The Court emphasized the situs of
the defendant's property and the physical presence of the defendant
in the state.
The Court distinguished between assertion of jurisdiction over
10. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 488, 245 N.W.2d 624, 629 (1976), vacated and
remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
11. Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
12. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Shaffer, where the Court held that a defendant could not ob-
tain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by sequestering the defendants' shares of stock, extended the
minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe to in rem cases by requiring that the
property attached be intimately related to the litigation in order for the state to exercise in
rem jurisdiction over the defendant.
13. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 497, 272 N.W.2d 888 (1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320
(1980). Savchuk distinguished Shaffer on the ground that Delaware's sequestration statute
did not parallel the asserted state interest in management of the state-chartered corporation
because the sequestration procedure could be used in any suit against a nonresident. The
Minnesota Supreme Court argued that its garnishment procedure specifically premised ju-
risdiction on attachment of the obligation to defend the underlying claim. Id. at 502, 272
N.W.2d at 891.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23, 732-33 (1877); F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.13, at 626-27 (2d ed. 1977); Hazard,,4 General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 241, 262-63.
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See Hazard, supra note 14, which discusses at length the diffi-
culties encountered by Justice Field in deciding Pennoyer and creating its new rule.
16. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
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the person and jurisdiction over property and adopted separate re-
quirements for each. 17 Service of notice within the state's bounda-
ries was required for in personam jurisdiction.' 8 However, in rem or
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction could be obtained by attachment of prop-
erty within the state and with substituted service of process.1 9 The
concepts of in personam jurisdiction and in rem jurisdiction devel-
oped separately until a century later when both were subjected to
the same constitutional test in Shaffer v. Heitner.2 °
In personam jurisdiction was expanded considerably after Pen-
noyer. 2 1 Because of the rigid categories of in personam and in rem
jurisdiction prescribed in Pennoyer, fictions of consent to jurisdic-
tion and presence had to be relied on as bases for jurisdiction.22 In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington23 changed the constitutionally
permissible basis of jurisdiction from the fictions of consent, domi-
cile, or presence to reliance on "fair play and substantial justice."
The United States Supreme Court in International Shoe held that in
personam jurisdiction is justified when a defendant, though not in
the territory of the forum, has certain minimum contacts with the
forum state such that the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.
24
The Court in International Shoe emphasized the quality and
nature of the defendant's activities within the state in relation to the
17. Id. Traditionally, the theory was that "Judgments in personam bind the persons
who are before the court that renders the judgment, [while] judgments in rem were said to
bind the things upon which the court acts." R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 19, at
29 (3d ed. 1977).
18. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1877).
19. Id. at 723-24.
20. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 24A, at 40 (3d
ed. 1977).
21. Developments in (he Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 918
(1960).
22. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1978).
Pennoyer itself recognized some of these fictions to accommodate recurring issues such
as divorce actions litigated in the plaintiff's home state, 95 U.S. at 733-35, and foreign corpo-
rations doing business in a state impliedly consenting to be sued, id. at 735-36. See Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (domicile in a state sufficient for personal jurisdiction); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (approving a statute deeming nonresident motorists to have
impliedly consented to the appointment of the secretary of state as agent for service of pro-
cess); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917) (corporation doing
business in a state is considered to be present within the state for jurisdictional purposes);
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) (same).
23. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
24. Id. at 316. The International Shoe concept of fundamental fairness became the ba-
sis of examination of state court jurisdiction in the federal system. See Developments in the
Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960).
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fair and orderly administration of the state's laws. 25  The shift in
emphasis prompted many states to enact "long arm" statutes to aid
residents in obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.26
The progeny of International Shoe further defined the mini-
mum contacts rule. In Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co .27
the United States Supreme Court held jurisdiction to be justified
when the cause of action did not arise within the forum but enough
contacts were shown within the forum to establish fairness to a de-
fendant corporation. The Supreme Court also supported in per-
sonam jurisdiction where the controversy arose out of obligations
created by a single act within the state.28 In Hanson v. Denckla29 a
new test was added to the minimum contacts rule. The Supreme
Court held that the defendant must purposefully avail itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in a state and invoking the benefits
and protections of that state's laws.3°
During the same time period jurisdiction over property was fol-
lowing a different path of case law. In the landmark case of Harris
v. Balk3' a debt of an absentee defendant was held to be a garnisha-
25. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
26. The long arm statutes authorize constructive service on a defendant for causes of
action arising out of doing business within the state. "The basis of jurisdiction is the doing
of acts or causing acts to be done within the state, of a type so affecting the public interest
that the police regulation represented by these statutes is allowable." R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW § 38, at 65-66 (3d ed. 1977). See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2502 (1979).
27. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). The mining company was a Phillipine corporation. When the
operations of the company were halted because of World War II, the company president
returned to his home in Ohio and conducted his business from there. The Supreme Court
held that where an Ohio nonresident filed suit in Ohio concerning the Phillipine operations,
the court could accept jurisdiction consistent with International Shoe.
28. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). A Texas insurance
company issued a reinsurance certificate on a life insurance policy to a resident in California
and, according to the record, did no other business in California. When the insured died,
the company would not pay under the policy claiming that the policyholder committed sui-
cide. The contacts which supported the California court's jurisdiction over the Texas insur-
ance company were that the policyholder and the beneficiary were residents of California,
the policy was issued there, the premiums were mailed from there, and the witnesses were
California residents. Also, California had a valid interest in providing a forum for its
residents.
29. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). A Florida court attempted to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over a Delaware trustee who had been administering a trust created by a testatrix when she
lived in Pennsylvania. She subsequently moved to Florida. There was considerable busi-
ness correspondence between the trustee and the testatrix but the Supreme Court held that
the contacts were insufficient for the Florida court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over
the trustee.
30. Id. at 253.
31. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). A resident of the forum state sought to enforce a claim by
garnishing a debtor of a nonresident defendant. The garnishee admitted the debt, and the
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ble res. It was held that a court that had personal jurisdiction over a
debtor of the defendant could garnish the debt in the forum for pur-
poses of obtaining quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Expanding on the Har-
ris holding, the New York Court of Appeals in Seider v. Roth"
allowed the obligation an insurance company owed to its policy-
holder to be considered a garnishable "debt." In Seider, a plaintiff
was allowed to bring a quasi-in-rem action by attaching a liability
insurance obligation to a nonresident defendant.33
The Seider rule has been controversial from its inception.34
Only the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and two state courts have
followed the doctrine.35 The Second Circuit based its decision on
the fact that the attachment of the insurance policy was a judicially
created equivalent of a direct action statute.36 Many jurisdictions
have considered and rejected the Seider doctrine.37
plaintiff obtained judgment. Payment of the debt discharged plaintiff's claim, and the judg-
ment would be recognized in the state in which the creditor lived. The debt was found to
have a situs wherever the debtor was found.
32. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
33. The plaintiffs, residents of New York, were injured in an automobile accident in
Vermont, allegedly through the negligence of one of the defendants, a resident of Canada.
Although the defendant's insurance policy was issued in Canada, the insurance company
also did business in New York. The New York courts held that the contractual obligation
was attachable. Since the policy required the insurance company to defend the policyholder
in any automobile negligence action, the court found that a contractual obligation arose on
the part of the insurance company as soon as the accident occurred. The court recognized
that this was like a direct action against the insurer but found no policy reasons to disallow
it. Id. at 112-13, 216 N.E.2d at 314-15, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02. See also Simpson v. Loeh-
mann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), where a closely divided
court upheld the Seider doctrine.
34. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 25, at 43 (3d ed. 1977); Reese, The Ex-
panding Scope of Jurisdiction Over Non Residents-New York Goes Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL
J. 118 (1968); Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back Into Its
Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 660 (1971).
35. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969). New Hampshire and Minnesota followed Seider. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480,
496, 272 N.W.2d 888 (1979), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617,
313 A.2d 129 (1973).
36. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969). In Minichiello the court relied heavily upon Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), where the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana direct action stat-
ute.
Direct action statutes permit an injured person to maintain an action directly
against the tortfeasor's liability insurer, without first getting judgment against the
tortfeasor. Such a statute may apply either if the contract of liability insurance was
made in the state having the statute, on a contract characterization, or if the injury
was inflicted there, on a tort theory.
R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 153, at 316 (3d ed. 1977).
37. Eg., Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768
(1976); Grinnell v. Garrett, 295 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1974); Belcher v. Government Employ-
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A century after Pennoyer differentiated between a state court's
exercise of jurisdiction over property and persons, the principles of
International Shoe were extended to govern assertion of in rem as
well as in personam jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner.38 As early as
1950, the Supreme Court indicated that the requirements of the
fourteenth amendment with respect to notice do not depend upon
whether the jurisdiction is classified as in personam or in rem. 39 It
was not until Shaffer, however, that the Court recognized that as-
serting jurisdiction over property is actually asserting jurisdiction
over the owner of the property as well.4
In Shaffer the Supreme Court held that quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion may not be exercised unless it can meet the minimum contacts
test of International Shoe. In other words, for a court to exercise
jurisdiction over property, the contacts must be such that the owner
would be subject to personal jurisdiction.4 The Court distinguished
between quasi-in-rem proceedings where the property was the sub-
ject of the litigation and those where the only purpose of the res was
to obtain jurisdiction over the personal interest of the defendant in
that res.42 The Shaffer Court expressly rejected the basis of the
holding of Harris v. Balk,43 holding that minimum contacts between
the defendant and the forum are required for the exercise of quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction."
The Shaffer decision left several questions open for interpreta-
tion by the courts. The Supreme Court has tried to define more
ees Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978); State ex rel. Government Employees Ins. Co.
v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. 1970); Hart v. Cote, 145 N.J. Super. 420, 367 A.2d 1219
(1976); Jardine v. Donnelly, 413 Pa. 474, 198 A.2d 513 (1964); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I.
240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970). See also
Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976); Tessier v. State Farm Mutual Ins.
Co., 458 F.2d 1299 (1st Cir. 1972); Kirchman v. Mikula, 443 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971); Robin-
son v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, 429 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970); Sykes v. Beal, 392 F. Supp. 1089 (D.
Conn. 1975); Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt. 1970).
38. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
39. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
40. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). In Shaffer, the plaintiff, a stockholder
in the Greyhound Corp., sought to bring a stockholders' derivative action against some di-
rectors and officers of the corporation. To acquire jurisdiction in Delaware over the defend-
ants, the plaintiff obtained an order, based on Delaware law, for sequestration of the
defendants' shares of Greyhound stock. Because Delaware had no limited appearance stat-
ute, the defendants had to lose their stock or submit to in personam jurisdiction in Delaware.
The defendants argued that the minimum contacts test of International Shoe should be
applied.
41. Id. at 209. See Comment, Minimum Contacts Analysis of ln Personam Jurisdiction
Over Individuals Based on Presence, 33 ARK. L. REV. 159 (1979).
42. 433 U.S. at 209.
43. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
44. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
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specifically the meaning of "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice" in recent decisions through factual inquiries into the
existence of sufficient minimum contacts.45 In World- Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson,46 for example, the Court held that a de-
fendant's connection with the forum state is sufficient if he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. The possibility
that a product might make its way into a forum state is not an ade-
quate basis of jurisdiction.47 The Court also held that financial ben-
efits accruing from a collateral relation to the forum state, by
themselves, will not support jurisdiction."
With the rejection of Harris, the viability of the Seider rule was
questioned,49 although the New York courts reaffirmed the Seider
rule after Shaffer. 0 The United States Supreme Court first consid-
ered the constitutionality of the Seider rule in Rush v. Savchuk.51
The Court held that garnishment of an insurer's obligation to an
insured was unconstitutional and not the equivalent of a direct ac-
tion statute.
5 2
45. E.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In Kulko the Court held that the
state's interest in facilitating child support actions on behalf of resident children is not, by
itself, enough to make the state a fair forum for a nonresident defendant. The defendant
and his wife lived in New York with their two children before they separated and the wife
moved to California. She subsequently obtained a divorce in Haiti which gave custody of
the children to the defendant. Eventually the children moved to California with their
mother, and she brought an action against the defendant in California to establish the Hai-
tian decree as a California judgment, to modify the judgment so as to award her full custody
of the children, and to increase the defendant's child support obligations. She attempted to
base jurisdiction on the purchase of a oneway airline ticket to California for one of the
children. The Court held that sufficient contacts did not exist for the California court to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.
46. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
47. In World- Wide Volkswagen the plaintiffs bought a car from a car dealer in New
York while they were residents of New York. As the plaintiffs were driving through
Oklahoma, they were involved in an accident, and they subsequently brought a products
liability suit in Oklahoma against the dealer and its regional distributor. The Supreme
Court held that the mere fact that a product may find its way to a particular forum does not
create sufficient "contacts, ties, or relations" with that forum to sustain in personam jurisdic-
tion over a defendant corporation. Id. at 298-99.
48. Id. at 299. The respondents contended that jurisdiction was supported by the fact
that petitioners earned substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.
49. Comment, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth After Shaffer V. Heitner, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 409 (1978).
50. Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1978). See also
O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
The courts based their decisions that the Seider rule was still constitutional after Shaffer on
the fact that the insurance policy was related to the injury and that the full force of the
judgment rested on the insurer.
51. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
52. Id. at 330-33.
The Savchuk court held that state court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe
and its progeny. Minimum contacts must exist between the defend-
ant and the forum state so that the assertion of jurisdiction will not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
53
The only contact Rush had with Minnesota was the fact that his
insurance company did business in Minnesota.1
4
The Court restated its holding in Shaffer that mere presence of
property in the state is not sufficient to support the exercise of juris-
diction over the property owner.5" The Supreme Court held that,
even assuming the insurance obligation is a garnishable res, it does
not satisfy the minimum contacts analysis. The mere fact that the
defendant's insurer does business in Minnesota does not lead to the
conclusion that the defendant engaged in any purposeful activity re-
lated to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction rea-
sonable. 6 The Court reasoned that an insurance policy does not
suggest any further contacts between the defendant and the forum
and pertains only to the conduct of the litigation, not its substance.
5 7
The Court also held that Seider-type actions are not the
equivalent of a direct action statute.58 It rejected the argument that
the Seider approach is fair to the insured defendant because liability
is limited to the policy amount and any judgment is satisfied from
policy proceeds which can be used for no other purpose. The Court
also disagreed that such actions were fair to the insurer because its
forum contacts would support in personam jurisdiction even for an
unrelated cause of action. The Court rejected the assumption that
the defendant has no real stake in the outcome of the litigation. The
Court said the defendant did not extinguish his legal interest by in-
suring himself. Noneconomic factors such as the defendant's integ-
53. Id. at 332-33.
54. Id. at 328. The Court also stated:
In fact, the fictitious presence of the insurer's obligation in Minnesota does not,
without more, provide a basis for concluding that there is any contact in the Inter-
national Shoe sense between Minnesota and the insured. To say that "a debt fol-
lows the debtor" is simply to say that intangible property has no actual situs, and a
debt may be sued on whereever there is jurisdiction over the debt. State Farm is
"found," in the sense of doing business, in all 50 States and the District of Colum-
bia. Under appellee's theory, the "debt" owed to Rush would be "present" in each
of those jurisdictions simultaneously. It is apparent that such a "contact" can have
no jurisdictional significance. Id. at 329-30 (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 328.
56. Id. at 328-29.
57. Id. at 329.
58. Id. at 330.
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rity and competence as well as economic factors like the possibility
of the claim affecting the defendant's insurability should be consid-
ered.59 Unlike a direct action, the insured has to be named as a
defendant to make the insurer a party to the action. 60 Finding that
the Constitution forbids the assertion of jurisdiction over the in-
sured, the Court reasoned that there consequently is no basis for
making the garnishee a party to the action.6'
The Supreme Court held that the requirements of International
Shoe must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court
exercises jurisdiction. 62 The Court thus concluded that the Minne-
sota court's attempt to combine the forum contacts of the "defend-
ing parties" resulting in the assertion of jurisdiction over Rush
based solely on the activities of State Farm was plainly unconstitu-
tional.63 Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall pointed out that
justifications offered in support of the Seider doctrine shift the focus
of the inquiry to the plaintifis contacts with the forum state rather
than the defendants' contacts. 64 The Court stated that such an ap-
proach is forbidden by International Shoe and its progeny.65
In his dissenting opinion in Savchuk, Justice Stevens argued
that "the Minnesota statute authorizing jurisdiction is correctly
characterized as the 'functional equivalent' of a so-called direct ac-
tion statute." He stated that as long as it is clear that the forum may
not exercise any power over the defendant, it does not matter if the
suit is brought in his name or that of the insurance company.66 He
thought that in light of Watson v. Employer's Liability Assurance
Corp .67 the Constitution does not require that the Minnesota courts
dismiss the action.68
Justice Brennan also dissented,69 arguing that the Court gave
too much weight to the consideration of contacts between the de-
fendant and the forum. He felt that more weight should have been
59. Id. at 331 n.20.
60. Id. at 330-31.
61. Id. at 331.
62. Id. at 332.
63. Id. at 331-32.
64. Id. at 332.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 333-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
68. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 333-34 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Justice Brennan issued one dissent applicable to both Savchuk and World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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given to the state's interest in supplying a forum for its residents.7 °
Brennan argued that Minnesota had expressed its interest by enact-
ing the garnishment statute. 7' The plaintiff's residence in the state
made it one of the few forums available to him.72 He felt that the
Court should also have attached more importance to the actual bur-
den on the defendant,73 concluding that the real impact is the same
as if a direct action were filed against the insurer.74
The Supreme Court in Savchuk finally resolved the conflict and
controversy over the Seider rule which had endured fourteen
years.75  The Court expressly rejected the Seider doctrine. The
Court's continued emphasis on fairness to the defendant led to this
rejection. No argument in favor of the doctrine was left unan-
swered.
Some of the Seider jurisdictions may attempt to effectuate the
state's interest in providing a forum for its residents by the enact-
ment of a direct action statute. The application of such a statute,
however, would probably be limited to injuries occurring within the
state.76 Thus, a plaintiff in Savchuk's position would still not have a
forum in his resident state.
A trend seems to emerge from the post-Shaffer cases of restrict-
ing state court jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.77 A closer
look at the language of the opinions indicates, however, that the
Supreme Court is trying to establish a uniform standard for the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The Court con-
tinually stresses fairness to the defendant with the application of the
"minimum contacts" test and recognition of the "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. ' 78 The "minimum contacts" test
70. Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 302.
72. Id. at 303.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 303-04.
75. As recently as 1978, the Supreme Court had rejected a chance to review the Seider
doctrine. Lee-Hy Paving Corp. v. O'Connor, 441 U.S. 918 (1978) (Justices Powell and
Blackmun dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
76. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). In Watson
the Supreme Court held a Louisiana direct action statute to be constitutional. The opinion
placed great emphasis on the facts that the plaintiff was injured in Louisiana, the defendant
carried on many activities within the state, and the state had a vital interest in the out of
state contract. See also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 331 n. 19 (1980); R. LEFLAR, AMERI-
CAN CONFLICTS LAW § 25, at 44 (3d ed. 1977).
77. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
78. The requirements were espoused in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), and applied to in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitaer, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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of International Shoe expanded in personam jurisdiction to allow
assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has mini-
mum contacts with the forum state even if the traditional require-
ments of presence within the state are not met. This same
constitutional test, on the other hand, restricts in rem jurisdiction by
basing the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on
whether there are sufficient contacts between the defendant, the fo-
rum, and the litigation regardless of the fact that the attached prop-
erty has a situs within the state.
When the assertion of in personam jurisdiction was based on
the traditional test that a defendant had to be within the state's
boundaries, obtaining quasi-in-rem jurisdiction was a convenient
way to counteract the strict in personam jurisdiction requirements.
With the relaxation of these requirements in International Shoe,7 9
the quasi-in-rem garnishment procedure was not as necessary to a
plaintiff in most situations, and attachment of property merely for
the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant
is contrary to the emphasis on "fair play and substantial justice."
The Supreme Court will probably continue to reject this application
of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction where the property is not the subject of
the litigation or very closely related to the litigation.
While McGee v. International Life Insurance Co .o appeared to
be an extreme extension of jurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant, it can still be reconciled with Savchuk. Although the Supreme
Court upheld jurisdiction in McGee based on only one insurance
policy issued in the forum state, it is clear that the Court's emphasis
was on the relationship of that policy to the litigation. The policy
was, in fact, the subject of the litigation. The policyholder, his bene-
ficiary, and the witnesses were all residents of the forum state.," In
Savchuk the car accident, not the policy, was the subject of the liti-
gation and only the plaintiff was a resident of the forum state.
The first restriction of the "minimum contacts" test was recog-
nized in Hanson v. Denckla.s2 It was here the Supreme Court
adopted the view that to satisfy the "minimum contacts" test the
defendant should have purposely availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in a foreign state, thus having invoked the pro-
tections of that state's laws. 3 The Court was considering the intent
79. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
80. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
81. Id. at 223.
82. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
83. Id. at 253.
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of the defendant to conduct activity in a state and bring himself
within that state's jurisdiction. Hanson is still valid under the ra-
tionale of Savchuk. In Savchuk the Court appears to be adhering to
the Hanson test where it found that the mere fact the defendant's
insurer does business in Minnesota does not indicate that the de-
fendant engaged in any purposeful activity related to the forum that
would make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.84
It is clear from the Court's opinions that there are no hard and
fast rules on jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The facts of
each case will have to be weighed. This may necessitate more rul-
ings by the Supreme Court in this area. At this point, the continuing
emphasis seems to be on fairness to the defendant. This emphasis
has greatly restricted a plaintiffs chance of bringing suit against a
nonresident defendant in the plaintiffs state. Based on the Savchuk
decision, when an injury occurs outside of the plaintiffs state of resi-
dence,85 he will have to incur the burden and expense of bringing
his action in the state where the injury occurred unless the litigation
has contacts with his home state.
Mary Harmon
84. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1980). Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (products liability case involving car bought in New York
which burned in wreck in Oklahoma in which local dealer and his distributor had no con-
tacts with or activity in Oklahoma to justify their being sued there).
85. In Savchuk the defendant moved to Minnesota after the accident occurred. In other
Seider-type actions, however, the plaintiffs were residents of the forum state when the event
being litigated occurred. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). See Minichiello v. Rosen-
berg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
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